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NOTES & COMMENT
LARCENY GENERICALLY, AND THE OFFICE OF A BILL OF PARTICULARS IN RESPECT TO AN INDICTMENT-In a recent opinion handed down

by the Court of Appeals, the court again had occasion to discuss the
meaning of larceny by trick, and obtaining property by false pretense.1
If the opinion in this case merely discussed the definition of these two
crimes, then the subject could well be disregarded for it has been
amply covered in the past by judicial opinion and controversial legal
literature.2 The decision, however, has new importance. Judge Crane,
People v. Noblett, 244 N. Y. 355 (1927).
'Thus, in Hilderbrand v. People, 56 N. Y. 394 (1874), the prosecuting
witness handed the prisoner, who was a bartender in a saloon, a fifty dollar
bill to take ten cents out in payment for a soda. It was held that it was
an incomplete transaction, to be consummated in the presence of and under
the personal control of the complainant. The delivery of the bill and the
change were to be simultaneous acts, and until the latter was performed,
the delivery was not complete. The rule thus enunciated was further extended in a later case Justices of Court of Special Sessions v. People, 90
N. Y. 12 (1882), where the same conclusion was reached, when the prosecuting witness gave the prisoner a twenty dollar bill and requested him
to go out and get it changed, on the ground that the prosecutor intended
to give up only his custody, but not possession, for a special purpose.
Contra: In England it was decided, on almost the identical facts that
the "prosecutor had divested himself, at the time of the taking of the entire
possession of the money and that consequently there was not sufficient
trespass to constitute larceny." Reg. v. Reynolds, 2 Cox C.C. 170 (1847);
Reg. v. Thomas, 9 C. & P. 741 (1841).
It is submitted, however, that the New York Rule is the sounder one.
When the prosecuting witness turned over the bill and requested the prisoner
to go out and get it changed, the relation between them was substantially
that of master and servant, and a servant, having only the custody of the
bill, is guilty of larceny in converting it.
In State v. Walker, 65 Kan. 92, 68 Pac. 1085 "(1902), a person gave
to another money to be changed into a different form and put in a letter
to be deposited in the post office. The one to whom it was given took
the money, made the change, put it in the letter, and, without mailing it,
kept it and re'fused to return it to the giver. It was held that the one
who refused to complete the direction given and the return of the money
was guilty of larceny. In State v. Marnes, 26 Wash. 160, 66 Pac. 431
(1901), goods were. intrusted to another to sell, he to return the same or
account therefor by producing the money realized from their sale, retaining
a certain per cent as commission. It was held that there was no relation
of debtor and creditor and on failure to account the agent is guilty of
larceny. In Bailey v. State, 58 Ala. 414 (1877), where one gave a ten
dollar bill in over payment of a two dollar debt and defendant subsequently appropriated such overpayment to his own use on discovering the
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who dissented in that case, scorned a decision which sets a criminal
free because the defendant was convicted of larceny by trick when,
according "to an artificial distinction," he should have been tried for
obtaining property by false pretenses. Judge Lehman, who spoke for
the majority, seemed to sympathize with Judge Crane's views. He
held, however, that the change must be made by Legislative Enactment and not by judicial decision for courts cannot disregard the plain
import of the larceny statute in order to hold a person who apparently
had committed a crime. If propriety could be placed on wings, one
might be tempted not only to disagree with judge Crane, but, also to
reject the sympathy that Judge Lehman declares for the view ex3
pressed by his dissenting brother.
mistake it was held to constitute larceny provided that the defendant had
knowledge of the mistake at the time it was made. This distinction" is well
drawn in the. case of Wilson v. People, 39 N. Y. 459 (1868). Accord: State
v. Williamson, Haust. Cri. Cases (Del.) 155, (1864); Farrell v. People, 16
Ill. (6 Peck) 506 (1855) ; Commonwealth v. Barry, 124 Mfass. 325 (1878) ; State
v. Ducker, 80 R. I. 394 (1880). C.f. Regina v. Hehir, 2 Ir. R. 709 (1895).
"Larceny and embezzlement belong to the same family of crimes; the
distinguishing feature being that to constitute larceny there must have been
a trespass or wrong to the possession, but where one gains possession of
the property so as to constitute only a bare charge, or custody, or procures
it by subterfuge, it does not divest the possession of the true owner; he
is still in constructive possession and the offense of appropriating the property is larceny." Boswell v. State, 1 Ala. App. 178, 56 So. 21, 22 (1911);
People v. Grider, 13 Col. App. 703, 118 Pac. 729 (1911). c.f. Welch v. State,
126 Ga. 495, 55 S.D. 83 (1906). But see 2 Bishop, Criminal Law (9th Ed.
1923) § 824(2).
The distinction between larceny and false pretenses is, in the former
the owner of goods has no intention to part with his property therein,
while in the latter the owner does intend to part with his property, which
intention is the result of fraudulent contrivances. Zink v. People, 77 N.Y.
114 (1879), this case may be distinguished from the cases of Smith v.
People, 53 N.Y. 111 (1873); Loomis v. People, 67 N.Y. 322 (1876), and
Hilderbrand v. Pople, 56 N.Y. 394 (1874) ; in that in those cases the complainant gave up his custody for a special purpose while in the principal
case the prisoner was vested with the indicia of ownership, an order bill
of lading on which he paid the freight. People v. Dumar, 106 N.Y. 503
(1887), decided after the passage of the Penal Code, made the same distinction between larceny and obtaining property by false pretenses.
People v. Noblett, supra, Note 1, per Lehman J., "Narrow technical
distinctions by which a wrong-doer may escape the consequences of a
crime hinder the administration of justice. The Courts which administer
the law fail to function properly when the penalty which the law has
placed upon the commission of a crime may be evaded by the proven
criminal through subtle reasoning based on obsolete theory. These are
truisms, which should require no repetition, but they may not lead the
court to create a new definition of a particular crime because judges may
believe that the limits previously fixed are too narrow. It is the function
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At early common law, to constitute the crime of larceny, thete
had to be a felonious taking and carrying away of the personal goods
of another. 4 This rule obtained until the year 1779 when larceny by
trick and device first came into the law. In the famous case of King
v. Pear, 5 the defendant obtained a horse from the prosecuting witness
and agreed to return it one week later. In fact, the defendant
intended to convert the horse to his own use. For the first time, it
was held that if a person is induced to surrender to another the right
to possession of his property through the perpetration of a trick or
device, the wrong-doer has committed larceny. The court apparently
proceeded on the theory that the owner would not have surrendered
possession but for the fraud of the wrong-doer, and, therefore, the
Court reached the conclusion that the law should treat such a situation
as though possession had been obtained through a wrongful taking.
Of courge, this argument is unsound in theory and a myriad of cases
in the law of sales declared a contrary rule.6 Nevertheless, forever
after, the name "larceny by trick or device" was given to those cases
where the owner of the property was induced to make a voluntary
surrender of possession because of some simulation concocted by the
of the legislature to determine whether modem conditions dictate a wider
definition of acts which subject the wrong-doer to criminal responsibility. We may not assume that function even where the established definition of crime may he based upon distinctions which seem at the present
time inconsequential. We may not hold that acts come within such definition which, under recognized authority have been hitherto included."
'Rex v. Raven, Kel. 224 (1663).
"All felony includes trespass, and every indictment of larceny must
have the words felonice cepit, as well as asportavit; from whence it follows, that if the party be guilty of no trespass in taking the goods, he
cannot be guilty of felony in carrying them away." 1 Hawkens P.C. ch.
33 par. 2.
'King v. Pear, 2 East P.C. 685 (1779).
' It has long been held in the law of sales that a contract tainted with
fraud by the buyer (what might reasonably be called "'rick and device by
the prisoner in the criminal law) is merely voidable, and not void. Hunter
v. Hudson River Iron, etc., Co., 20 Barb (N.Y.) 493 (1855); Matteawan
Co. v. Bently, 13 Barb (N.Y.) 641 (1852); Pikes Peak Paint Co. v. Mansury, 19 Cal. App. 286, 74 Pac. 796 (1903); Fleming v. Hanley, 21 R.I. 141,
42 At. 520 (1899).
In Nichols v. Pinner. 18 N. Y. 295, 306 (1858), it was held "But on the
other hand, if the purchase was made with the dishonest purpose of subjecting the goods to the payment of other debts, thus defrauding the plaintiffs, the sale was voidable * * *"
Since a voidable title presupposes at least a legal possession in the
beginning it is inconceivable how it can be said that in case of larceny
by trick and device the possession is wrongful. It may only be explained
by calling such a finding a fiction of the law.
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wrong-doer to obtain possession to distinguish these cases where the
possession is obtained by the wrong-doer through a wrongful taking
from those where possession is obtained by trick, learned writers gave
to the original category the name of "larceny by trespass."
The generic term "larceny" thereafter embraced the cases of
larceny by trespass and larceny by trick or device. To this day the
distinction exists in the law. When possession is obtained through a
wrongful taking, it constitutes larceny by trespass. When possession
is obtained through artifice, it constitutes larceny by trick or device.
In 1799, embezzlement first came into the law. The court having
declared in Rex v. Bazeley,8 that it did not constitute crime for a
servant to convert the property of his master which the servant
obtained from a third party, the English Parliament, passed a statute
making embezzlement a crime.9
There are other situations that sound in larceny, and yet do not
come within the technical meaning of that term. It should be remembered that originally larceny meant taking property of another by
trespass. it was the opinion of English 'people that the law cannot
protect human beings who fail to take the proper caution to protect
themselves. As indicated, larceny by trick came many years after
larceny by trespass had become firmly established.
A fourth situation was presented by those cases where a person
with criminal intention held himself out as a prospective purchaser
and where the owner of personal property not knowing of the scheme
made a sale of his merchandise to one who never had the intention
to pay therefor.' 0 The courts could not hold this to be larceny by
trespass because the property was voluntarily surrendered. The owner
'"Some other crime, where there is no trespass, therefore no larceny,
may be constituted by the transaction." 2 Bish. Crim. Law (9th ed. 1923),
§ 800 (1).
'Rex v. Bazeley, 2 Leach (4th ed.) 835 (1799).
'39 George Ill. Chapt. 85.
"In Regina v. Slowly, 12 Cox C.C. 269 (1873), the complainant unloaded some onions at a place designated by the defendant, relying upon
his staterhent that "you shall have your money directly the onions are
unloaded," when in fact, there never was any intention of paying therefor.
The defendant was held guilty of larceny since the passing of title to the
onions and payment for them were intended to be simultaneous and until
the payment was made, delivery was incomplete. The Court also said
that if it had been intended by the prosecutor to give credit for the price
of the onions even for a single hour it would not have been larceny. To
the same effect is the case of Queen v. Russett, 2 Q.B. D 312 (1892);
Shippley v. People, 86 N.Y. 375 (1881). But see Thorn v. Truck, 94 N.Y.
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had completely divested himself of every indicia of ownership and not
merely of bare possession. To remedy that situation, the statute of
30 George III' was passed. This statute was considered to extend to
every case where a party had obtained money or property by farsely
representing himself to be in a situation in which he was not. This
statute is really the forerunner of our12 present statutes with regard to
obtaining property by false pretenses.
As the law now stands, there are four situations on which Government can lay an indictment. First, where a person wrongfully takes
the property of another. That we call larceny by trespass. Second,
where a person induces an owner to surrender mere possession to him
through trick or device; as for instance, when a person obtains
property under a bailment arrangement, when, in fact, the purported
bailee never intends to return the property but intends to convert it to
his own use. That we call larceny by trick or device. The third
classification includes those cases in which a person who is either al
attorney, trustee or a servant, who receives property from a third
person for his master, comes rightfully into possession of property,
but after receiving possession, converts the property to his own use.
That we call embezzlement.' 3 In the fourth category are those cases
90 (1883). "Where one is induced to part with his property by fraudulent
means, but he actually intended to part with it and delivered up possession
absolutely, it is not larceny."
"30 George II.
1 Penal code § 1290:
A person who, with intent to deprive or defraud the true owner of
his property, or the use and benefit thereof, or to appropriate the same to
the use of the taker, or of any other person:
Takes from the possession of the true owner, or of any other person;
or obtains from such possession by color or aid of fraudulent or false
pretense or representation, or of any false token or writing; or secretes,
withholds, or appropriates to his own use, or that of any other person
other than the true owner, any money, personal property, thing in action,
evidence of debt or contract, or article of value of any kind;
Steals such property, and is guilty of larceny.
"However, in connection with this classification it should be noted that
different situations might arise in which the question of possession is the
controllng factor and as Bla'kstone tersely sums up, "But if he had not
the possession but only the care and oversight of the goods, as the butler
of the plate, the shepherd of the sheep, and the like, the embezzling of
them is felony at common law." 4 Black Comm. 230, 231.
So, in Crocheron v. State, 86 Ala. 64, 5 So. 649 (1888), the prosecuting
witness hired the prisoner as a farm hand. The prisoner was given the
custody of a mule daily in order to plow a field and one day he failed to
return the mule, having converted it to his own use. It was held "That
the prosecutor had parted only with the custody of the animal, as dis-
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in which a wrong-doer induces the owner of property to give to him
not only possession, but also title, and the owner is induced to part
with title through the fraud of the wrong-doer. That we call obtaining property by false pretenses."
Difficulty at times arises in cases dealing with larceny by trick
and obtaining property under false pretenses. It has been urged that
the distinction between the two crimes is so technical that a statute
should be passed not merely consolidating the two crimes, as New
York State has already done, but at the same time to give by statute
tinguished from possession, which was still in him as owner, altho the
prisoner had the custody as a mere employee or servant. It has often
been decided, and is now settled law, that goods in the bare charge or
custody of a servant are legally in the possession of the master, and the
servant may be guilty of trespass and larceny by the fraudulent conversion
of such goods to his own use." 2 Bishop, Criminal Law, (7th Ed.) 1 § 639.
But when a third party delivers a chattel to the servant of another, in
sucl a case, converting the chattel to his own use, before some act of
appropriation which would tend to reduce to the possession of the master,
the servant is guilty of embezzlement. Thus, in Regina v. Reed, 6 Cox
C.C. 284 (1854), "there can be no doubt that, in such a case, the goods
must have been in the actual or constructive possession of the master; and
that, if the master had not otherwise possession of them than by the bare
receipl of his servant upon the delivery of another for the master's use,
although as against third persons this is in law a receipt of the goods by
the master, yet in respect of the servant himself this will not support a
charge of larceny, because as to him there was no tortious taking in the
first instance, and consequently no trespass * * *. But if the servant has
done anything which determines his original exclusive possession of the
goods, so that the master thereby comes constructively into possession, and
the servant 'afterwards converts their animo furandi, he is guilty of larceny,
and not merely of a breach of trust at common law, or of embezzlement
under the statute * * * that this exclusive possession was determined when
the coals were deposited in the prosecutor's cart, in the same manner as
if they had been deposited in the prosecutor's cellar of which the prisoner
had charge."
Hatcher v'. State, 74 Fla. 112, 476 So. 694 (1917) ; Rhode v. United States
34 App. D.C. 249 (1910) ; Barrow v. State, 126 Ga. 92, 54 S.E. 812 (1906);
State v. Coster, 170 Mo. App. 539, 157 S.W. 85 (1913).
No doubt a final deposit of mony in the till of a shop would have the
same effect. Waite's case, 2 East P.C. 570, 571 (1779) ; Bull's Case, 2
East P.C. 572 (1779). But "if the prisoner before he placed the money
in the drawer, intended to appropriate it, and with that intent simply put
it in the drawer for his own convenience in keeping it for himself, that
would not make his appropriation of it, just afterward, larceny."
Commonwealth v. Ryan, 155 Mass. 523, 30 N.E. 354 (1892); Sloan v.
Merrill, 135 Mass. 17; Jeffords v. Alvard, 151 Mass. 94, 23 N.E. 734 (1890);
Commonwealth v. Drew, 153 Mass. 588, 27 N.E. 593 (1891).

"' Supra,

note 2.
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discretion to the trial court to charge the jury on any one of the four
crimes regardless of the evidence adduced, even where the indictment
charges common law larceny. If this subject were merely viewed on
the technical basis that writers have urged, there would perhaps be
reason to make this change in our law. Larceny by trick means that
the wrong-doer obtained possession through artifice. Obtaining
property under false pretenses means obtaining not only possession but
also title to the property through some scheme.
It was urged in the Noblett case as well as by the late Professor
Gifford, 15 that since the distinction is between obtaining bare possession
on the one hand and possession and title on the other, that there is no
fundamental distinction in the two crimes. Instead of viewing this
situation in terms of possession and title, it would be well to try and
visualize the situation as it actually appears in court. A man is
indicted for having stolen property. By our traditions, he is presumed
innocent until his guilt is established. Under our law an indictment
is not evidence that the defendant is guilty of the crime with which
he is charged. Has a person so situated the legal and moral right to
demand that he be told whether he is charged merely with obtaining
the use of personal property of another through fraud or whether he
is charged with having bought the property without the intention to
pay? It would seem that the difference existing in those two situations
is fundamental. Year after year, hundreds of cases are tried under
the General Larceny Statute and courts and district attorneys seem
to know the difference in the fundamental concept that exists between
larceny by trick and obtaining property under false pretenses. Every
ten or fifteen years an error is committed and then wiiters and judges
urge that obsolete decisions lead to a miscarriage of justice when a
man who has committed a crime is set free because of technical rules. 18
It would seem wiser to permit these rare cases to occur rather than
to deny to a person the right that it is proclaimed exists in our criminat
" 20 Col. L. R. 318.
"People v. Noblett, supra note 1.
"Although such errors sometimes creep in and lead to a miscarriage
of justice, the opposite is sometimes true, and the meaning of the different
phases of larceny is stretched to prevent a travesty on justice. Thus, in
People v. Miller, 169 N.Y. 339, 62 N.E. 418 (1902), the prisoner, by a representation or promise to pay a dividend of 10% weekly until the deposit
was withdrawn, induced and duped a large number of people to invest
their moneys with him. These moneys were to be used by a syndicate for
speculative purposes and under a guaranty that they would be returned
at any time at one week's notice. In fact, the syndicate was never formed
and the money never invested. The Court held, reversing the ruling of
the Appellate Division that the "depositor" never intended to pass title to
the moneys so deposited. The prosecuting witness (depositor) intended

NOTES AND COMMENTS
law, that a person charged with crime is entitled to Know the crime
with which he is charged before he is called upon to make his defense."
In the Noblett case, the facts appeared to be that in March, 1926,
the defendant was the tenant of an apartment on Riverside Drive in
the City of New York. The term of his lease had expired but the
to part only with the manual custody of the moneys so delivered, unless
or until the moneys were hsed for the purpose for which they were delivered, delivery was incomplete and title did not pass. This arbitrary
ruling may be explained only by a careful scrutiny of the facts presented,
inasmuch as the judges themselves inferred that a conviction for obtaining money tinder false pretenses would have been highly improbable, and
to allow the prisoner to escape unpunished because of some technicality of
the law, would be a travesty on justice.
While it is conceded that in view of the facts of the case the holding
is a just one, yet, it is submitted, that it is technically unsound. In the
ordinary course of business, one who has complete control over money,
who is to use it or not as he sees fit, obligated only to pay dividends and
return the money on notice, who biears the loss in case of robbery, etc.,
stands in the position of a debtor to the original owner of the money and
to all intents and purposes is the owner thereof, not merely the custodian.
The Appellate Division, in reversing the conviction at the trial term per
Hirschherg, J., 64 App. Div. 450-458 (2nd Dept. 1901). "She (complainant)
intended to give the prisoner her money to gamble with in his own name
if he saw fit, only stipulating that she should receive the interest for the
use of the money and to be repaid upon demand. The money was not
delivered for any special purpose, or to be used or invested in any way
for her. It was his money * * *. In other words, she did not intend to
vest the prisoner with the mere naked custody and possession of the money
for safe keeping * * * she gave it to him so that he might gamble with
it in Wall Street as he saw fit and expected interest for the use of the
money, whether he lost or not * * *."
In the Noblett case, supra, the Court attempted to distinguish the case
from the Miller case, supra, in saying: "The owner parted with possession
of the property only for the purpose of enabling the prisoner to effectuate
some specific benefit in favor of the owner, whereas in the principal case
(Noblett), the owner parted absolutely with all control of the money and
vested in the prisoner the complete right to use it for his own purpose
and benefit, relying upon the prisoner's promise to transfer in the future
the stipulated consideration for the money." This distinction may well
be regarded as arbitrary as the holding in the Miller case.
"The proper office of a bill of particulars is to enlighten the defendant
as to charges made against him so as to enable him to prepare a defense.
It does not have to disclose the nature of the plaintiff's case. (Matthews v.
Hubbard, 47 N.Y. 428 (1872); Stern v. Wabash R.R. Co., 98 App. Div. 619
(1st Dept. 1904). There is no fixed and inflexible rule as to when a
party is entitled to a bill of particulars. The Court may, in the exercise
of its sound discretion, in a case where a party cannot properly prepare
for trial or justice cannot be done unless he is notified of the charges
against him, order the submission of a bill of particulars; Cunard v. Franklyn, 111 N.Y. 511, 19 N.E. 92 (1888) ; Tilton v. Beecher, 59 N.Y. 176 (1874).
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right of occupation and possession continued under the statutes known
as the Rent Laws. He inserted an advertisement in the New York
Times offering to sub-rent by month or year his furnished apartment.
The complaining witness read the advertisement on March 12. He
communicated with the defendant and pursuant to appointment met
the defendant at his apartment. On the following morning, the complaining witness paid the defendant a sum of money which represented
the agieed rental, but he did not receive possession of the apartment
which defendant agreed to rent to him, either on the day when the
contract was made or at any other time.
On these facts it would seem obvious that when the complaining
witness gave to the defendant the sum which was supposed to represent
the rental for the apartment, he intended that the defendant would
have that money as his own and that the complaining witness in return
would receive possession of the apartment. Actually it is admitted that
the defendant never intended to give to this complaining witness the
possession of the apartment; that the defendant intended to obtain this
money and wrongfully convert it to his own use. It nevertheless is true
that when the complaining witness surrendered this sum to the defendant, he parted with title to it. He intended that that money should
thereafter be the money of the defendant. It is conceded that if the
complaining witness had known of this scheme concocted by the defendant, he never would have surrendered the money to him but
under the arrangement the defendant was to have the money and the
complaining witness was to receive the possession of the apartment.
If the defendant was to have the money, then title passed to the defendant and he would be amenable to the statute with regard to obtaining money under false pretenses.
The indictment against the defendant contained two counts. The
first count charged in effect that the defendant obtained the sum of
$550. from the complaining witness by false and fraudulent pretenses.
The second count charged the defendant with committing larceny by
trick. The trial took place; the Government rested; and then both
district attorney and trial court could not decide whether the evidence
adduced would support the first count of the indictment which charged
the obtaining of money under false pretenses, or whether the evidence
As a general rule the effect of a bill of particulars is to restrict the
submitter thereof in the nature of his proofs. His evidence must fall
within the allegations of the bill of particulars. St. Albans Beef Co. v.
Aldridge, 112 App. Div. 803 (3rd Dept. 1906); Murray v. Mabie, 8 N.Y. S.
289 (5th Dept. 1889). Contra; Massachusetts Rules, Infra note No. 25.
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in the case would sustain the second count of the indictment which
charged larceny by trick. Quite a good deal of time was spent by
court and district attorney discussing this aspect of the case. Finally
a choice had to be made and the trial court deciddd that this evidence
would sustain the second count of the indictment which charged
larceny by trick.
It would seem that any person conversant with the fundamental
concepts of criminal law would have known that this evidence could
not sustain the second count of the indictment which charged larceny
by trick; that this evidence clearly sustained the first count of the
indictment which charged obtaining money by false pretenses.
The trial court having decided that this evidence supported the
second count of the indictment, dismissed the first count and then
charged the jury with regard to larceny by trick. Defendant was
found to be guilty and judgment was entered.
The Court of Appeals, Crane, J. and Andrew J. dissenting reversed
the judgment and dismissed the indictment. Judge Lehman who wrote
for the majority, bemoans the fact that a wrong-doer escapes punishment because of technical distinctions in the law but declares that "it
is the function of the Legislature to determine whether modern conditions dictate a wider distinction of acts which should subject the
wrong-doer to criminal responsibility." Is
Judge Crane in his dissenting opinion, urges that since under the
Code of Criminal Procedure, it is sufficient if the indictment contains
a plain and concise statement of the acts constituting the crime, that
9
Judge Crane apparently
this conviction should therefore be sustained.'
views this as a matter of proper wording of an indictment. It should
be remembered that in this case, the defendant was charged in two
counts; that the Government under the indictment could adduce all its
proof; that the- Government was not compelled to make an election until
after it rested; and that at that late stage both court and district
attorney could not decide whether the crime constituted larceny by
trick or obtaining money under false pretenses.
1

Supra note No. 3.

"Code Criminal Procedure § 275:
The indictment must contain:
(1) The title of the action, specifying the name of the Court to which
the indictment is presented, and the name of the parties,
(2) A plain and concise statement of the acts constituting the crime,
without unnecessary repetition.
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Judge Lehman in his majority opinion indicates improvments that
2
20
and in Massachusetts. 1
have been made both in England
Under the English statute, the trial court may in a proper case
charge the jury with regard to the crime of larceny even though the
indictment was predicated on obtaining property by false pretense.
The late Professor Gifford likewise praises this improvement in
the law

2

2

It is submitted that both the courts and writers -have overlooked
the fact that this statute merely enables the Crown to adduce evidence
with regard to larceny when the indictment charges the defendant with
obtaining property under false pretenses. Under this English statute a
trial court cannot charge a jury with regard to larceny when the evidence can only support a charge with regard to false pretense. The
same difficulty that the Court of Appeals recently encountered in the
Noblett case likewise appeared in England even after the enactment of
these statutes, and in Crown Cases Reserved a conviction had to be
23

quashed.

Again both writers and judges are inclined to praise the Massachusetts system. Under the Massachusetts Statute of 1899, it is sufficient to charge in the indictment that the person accused did steal
"England: In an indictment for embezzlement or fraudulent application
or disposition of property, the defendant may be found guilty of simple
larceny, or larceny as a clerk or servant or person employed in the public
service or police, and on an indictment for simple larceny the defendant
may he found guilty of embezzlement or fraudulent application or disposition of property. (Larceny Act, 1861, 24 and 25 Victoria c. 96 S. 72). A
defendant on an indictment for false pretenses may be found guilty, even
though it appears that the offence amounted to larceny (ibid, s. 88).
"Massachusetts: The Court may, upon the arraignment of the defendant,
or at any later stage of the proceedings, order the prosecution to file a
statement of such particulars as may be necessary to give the defendant
and the Court reasonable knowledge of the nature and grounds of the
crime charged, and if it has final jurisdiction of the crime, shall so order
at the request of the defendant if the charge would not be otherwise fully,
plainly, substantially, and formally set out. If there is a material variance
between the evidence and the bill of particulars, the Court may order
the bill of particulars to be amended, and may postpone the trial, * * *
R.L. of 1902 Chapt. 218 s. 39.
In aii indictment for criminal dealing with personal property with intent to steal, an allegation that the defendant stole said property shall be
sufficient; and such indictment may be supported by proof that the defendant committed larceny of the property, or embezzled it, or obtained
it by false pretenses. R.L. of 1902 Chapt. 218 § 40-formerly laws of
1899, chapt. 409 § 12.
" Supra, note 15.
Regina v. Solomons, 62 Law Times 672.
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without making the usual descriptive averments of asportation or means
used to obtain possession of the property, and larceny is defined as "the
criminal taking, obtaining or converting of personal property with
intent to defraud or deprive the owner permanently of the use of it;
including all forms of larceny, criminal embezzlement and obtaining
by criminal false pretenses."
Under R. L. C. 218 sub-division 39,24 the defendant is given the
right to a bill of particulars but the statute gives the government the
right to amend its bill even at the trial if the evidence adduced should
vary from the bill of particulars originally gii.en.
The Massachusetts Courts have interpreted this section to mean
that the granting of the bill no longer rests in the sound discretion
of the court but that instead the defendant can demand such a bill
25
as a matter of absolute right.
Therefore, the only advantage to be achieved from these Massachusetts statutes which judges and learned writers praise, is that the
government is not obliged to determine whether the facts will support
larceny by trick or false pretense at the time when the indictment is
found. The indictment can be worded in general language charging
the defendant with stealing property. Under the laws of procedure of
26
our state, the state can charge the defendant in four separate counts.
Supra, note 22.
Speaking of the right of the defendant to a bill of particulars, the
Massachusetts Court in Commonwealth v. Kelly, 184 Mass. 317, 324, 68
N.E. 346-348 (1903), makes the following statement: "This is a sufficient
protection to the accused. Indeed it is manifest that since under the
former practice the right to a bill of particulars was a matter that lay
within the diseretion of the Court and therefore could not be claimed as
of right. Commonwealth v. Wood, 4 Gray. 11. This statute which makes
the right to such a bill absolute places the accused in a better position than
he was before."
Again in Commonwealth v. McDonald, 187 Mass. 581, 585, 73 N.E.
852-853 (1905). "If the defendant desired further information to- enable
him to meet a more definite claim by the Government than was shown by
its formal allegations or more fully to make his defense, it was open to
him as of right to ask for specifications setting forth such additional facts.
R.L. C 218 § 39. This statutory provision preserved his constitutional rights
and offered him ample protection from being misled or rendered unable to
meet the real accusation made against him."
But compare the New York Rule, Supra note No. -17.
11Code Criminal Procedure § 279:
The crime may be charged in separate counts to have been committed
in a different manner or hy different means; and where the acts complained
of may constitute different crimes, such crimes may be charged in separate
counts.
21
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It cau charge hin in the first count with larceny by trespass, in the

second count with larceny by trick; in the third count with embezzlement; and in the fourth count with obtaining money under false
pretenses.
In the instant case, the indictment did contain two counts. The
defendant was charged under one count with false pretense. He was
charged in the second count with larceny by trick. Under the Massachusetts Law, the district attorney may amend his bill of particulars
even at the trial. But the statute does not permit a judge to charge
a jury with regard to larceny when the evidence can only sustain a
charge of false pretense.
In the Noblett case, the district attorney was not called upon to
make a choice until the State had rested. How could the Massachusetts
statute in any way affect the result in the instant case? Difficulty
arose only after the government had rested, when court and district
attorney could not determine which of the two counts the evidence
supported. As previously indicated, even after the statute of Victoria,
in Crown Cases Reserved, a conviction had to be quashed because the
2
Crown did not know the difference between false pretense and larceny. 7
Courts and writers seem to have forgotten that laws are not
self-executing and a statute cannot make them so. Consequently, if
the general views expressed by Judge Crane should be adopted it would
People v. Adler, 140 N. Y. 331, 35 N.E. 644 (1893) ; People v. McCarthy,
110 N.Y. 309, 18 N.E. 128 (1888); People v. Willson, 109 N.Y. 345, 16

N.E. 540 (1888).
But in no event must the proof adduced vary from the crime charged.
Thus where the indictment charges one crime and the evidence adduced
proves another, such variance is fatal and the indictment must be dismissed. People v. Dumar, 106 N.Y. 503 (1887); People v. Dunn, 6 N.Y. S
805 (1st Dept. 1889).
In People v. Dumar, 106 N.Y. 503 (1887), the indictment charged that
the defendant "unlawfully and feloniously did steal, take and carry away"
the property described. It was held that the indictment could not be sustained by proof that the defendant obtained possession of the property
from the owner upon a sale on credit induced by false and fraudulent
representations.
In People v. Dunn, 6 N.Y. S. 805 (1st Dept. 1889), the indictment
charged that the defendant "did take, steal, and carry away" certain property. It was held that there was no variance between the indictment and
the proof which showed that the defendant was a bank teller and had
taken the money while in his custody. It was also held not to be error
in allowing the amendment of the indictment so that it alleged the property belonged to the "President & Director of the Manhattan Co." and not
to the "Bank of Manhattan Co."
" Supra, note 23.
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be insufficient to enact a statute formulated on the Massachusetts plan.
The change must be even more revolutionary. The act would have
to deny to a defendant the right to a bill of particulars even though
under the Massachusetts law the defendant can demand it as of right.
In substance it would mean that only after the highest court has
decided on the law and the facts would a defendant know the crime
with which he had been charged, and of which he had been found
guilty. Probably no judge or student of the law would urge so radical
a change.
These views therefore could not be adopted unless ancient tradition were completely repudiated. It would lead to the conclusion that
it would be wiser to proceed on the premise that every man who is
indicted is guilty of the charges set forth in the indictment, and then
to effectuate this theory, adopt the wisdom of the Queen in Alice of
Wonderland,-we will have the execution first and the judgment
afterward.
W. E.

FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF DUPLEX V. DEERING.

-On the 11th of April, 1927, the Supreme Court of the United States
handed down the decision in the Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Association of North America.'
In a sense the
decision is only a reiteration of the propositions previously announced
by the court in Duplex v. Deering.2 The fact, however, that the
doctrine of the Duplex case has been thus reiterated and even extended by the Supreme Court has led a great many sympathizers with
the aims and methods of labor unions to pause and reconsider the
situation with regard to the effectiveness of the organization of labor
engaged in interstate commerce. These decisions, in both of which,
there were strong and well reasoned dissenting opinions, have led
many men to the conclusion that strikes in interstate commerce are
now practically illegal, will be enjoined by the courts and that unless
legislative relief is forthcoming from Congress, the organization of
labor in interstate commerce is practically without value.
The development of the doctrine of the Duplex case is extremely
interesting. The old views of the court as expressed in the Debs case
and the Danbury Hatters case 4 had been dealt with by tatute of
'U. S. Sup. Cf. Oct. T. 1926, No. 412, 71 L. Ed. 581 (1927).
2254 U. S 443 (1921).
'Re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895).
'Lowe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (1908), Lawlor v. Lowe, 235 U. S.
522 (1915).

